Kant on Humean doubt

kant agrees with Hume that we can in no way have insight by reason into the possibility of causality. he adds that we have equally little insight into the concept of subsistence. We can have no insioght into how a consequence can be drawn from the state of one thing to the state of others things outside it. and how substances, which have their own existence, can be dependent on one another necessarliy. Kant believes these concepts and their principles stand a priori before all experience, and have thier undoubted objective rightness, though only in respect of experience. He says that he cannot conceive of the possibility of such a connection of existence, but he is more concerned with how cognition of things by experience is determined in respect of said moments of judgements in general; how things as objects of experience, can be and are to be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding. And it is clear that he has perfect insight into the necessity of subsuming all appearances under these concepts; into using them as principles of the possiblity of experience. he says that if a proposition that is a subjective connection of perceptions is to be a proposition of experience it must be regarded as necessary and universally valid. It would become a law, and valid because of the purpose of experience, which needs comprehensively and therefore necessarliy valid rules. So he says he does have insight into the concept of cause, as a concept necessarliy belonging to the mere form of experience, and into its possiblilty as a synthetic unification of perceptions in a consciousness in general; but he has no insight at all into the possibility of a thing in gerneral as a cause, because the concept of cause indicates a condition not attached in any way to the things, but only to experience, namely, that experience can only be objectively valid cognition of appearances and of their sequence in time if the antecedent appearance can be joined with the subsequent appearance according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.